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Abstract Corporate social responsibility is often framed
in terms of opposing constructions of the firm. These
reflect, respectively, different accounts of its obligations:
either to shareholders or to stakeholders (who include
shareholders). Although these opposing constructions of
corporate responsibility are diametrically opposed, they are
also much more fluid and mobile in certain contexts, since
they can act as discursive resources that are deployed and
brought into play in the struggle over shaping what
responsibility means. They are less the fixed, ideological
‘‘signposts’’ they might appear, and more like ‘‘weather-
vanes’’ that move alongside changing rhetorical currents.
To show this, we analyse the Securities and Exchange
Commission consultation process, and legislation, relating
to the provenance of ‘‘conflict minerals’’. We identify two
dialectically opposed camps, each seeking to influence final
legislation and with end goals in keeping with the share-
holder/stakeholder dichotomy. One camp lobbied for firms
to scrutinize their entire supply chain, constructing the firm
as a ‘‘global citizen’’ with very wide social responsibilities.
The second camp lobbied for a lighter touch approach,
constructing the firm as a ‘‘trader’’, with much narrower
social responsibilities. We analyse the complex interplay
between these two opposed camps, our contribution being
to show how both deploy competing conceptions of the
corporation as discursive resources.
Keywords Auditing  Conflict minerals  Disclosure 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)  Corporate
social responsibility
While long seen as a problem of state failure, the link
between armed conflict and minerals sourcing has only
recently gained attention as an issue of corporate social
responsibility (CSR) (Reinecke and Ansari 2015). Natural
deposits of precious metals such as gold ore, cassiterite (the
source of tin), coltan (a key ingredient in mobile phone
technology) and tungsten, fuel some of the world’s most
brutal conflict. The trade and supply in these minerals is
helping to sustain the sale of illegal arms, and to prop up
the regimes of dictators and warlords who subjugate, tor-
ture, imprison, brutalize and exploit so many. Often
countries that are rich in minerals are impoverished in
terms of their governance and corruption and bribery are
simply the price of doing business (Agbiboa 2012; Mellahi
et al. 2010). The trade in minerals that underpins contem-
porary technology can be seen as the continuation of a
centuries old tradition of colonialism, where the natural
and human resources of Africa support life in the privi-
leged North. As Shatz (2014, p. 31) expresses it:
Africa, it’s said, is the mother of modern civilisation,
but it’s probably more accurate to say that Congo is.
Consider your mobile phone. Before it was assem-
bled in a Chinese factory, the coltan in its capacitors
may have been dug by miners in the Eastern Congo,
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where millions have died in a series of wars over
‘conflict minerals1’
In countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC), a lack of civic infrastructure and absence of
governance, combined with entrenched patterns of abuse
and exploitation, supports a burgeoning trade in ‘conflict
minerals’ (Rotter et al. 2013). The DRC today is a war-
torn, failed state where one child in five dies before the age
of five and less than half the population has access to
drinking water (Shatz 2014). Yet amidst this putrefaction,
violence and poverty, corporations find cheap resources.
Many of the products that the world’s citizens routinely use
have their roots in armed conflict in the DRC. These roots
are not easy to trace since these minerals are the building
blocks in highly complex manufacturing processes and are
often sourced via labyrinthine supply chains. Conflict
minerals criss-cross continents and companies, perhaps
passing through the hands of smugglers one day only to
find themselves on the conveyor belt of a high-tech
manufacturing plant the next. Transport industries in the
DRC are virtually unregulated and the absence of other
adequately enforceable legislation on arms means that a
confluence of minerals; arms and war binds together
criminals; and corporations and consumers. It is not simply
the geographical and financial complexities of the supply
chain, but the nature of globalized manufacturing which
makes locating responsibility difficult.
In this complex setting, we examine the attributions and
auditing of ‘conflict minerals’, analysing how this issue is
treated in accounting practices. More specifically, our
focus is on the submissions and rulings by the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and by the Supreme
Court that were stimulated by the Dodd-Frank Act Sec-
tion 1502. This Act essentially opened up new discursive
terrain, where the ontological and ethical status of the
corporation became contested. A possibility emerged: that
the corporation could be construed as an ethical agent, with
responsibilities analogous to human citizens. This possi-
bility was rejected by many industry associations and
corporations trading in conflict minerals, and promoted by
those lobbying for greater accountability and change in this
trade.
In our analysis, we map this discursive terrain and
identify two dialectically opposed constructions of the
corporation. On one side of the dialectic is the view of the
firm as a ‘trader’ or nexus of contracts (Jensen and
Meckling 1976); where corporations have no special social
responsibilities and so stricter auditing requirements in
relation to supply chain transparency can be disputed
purely on economical and practical grounds. On the other
side of the dialectic is the view of the corporation as a
moral actor or ‘citizen’, with responsibilities in relation to
the public good (Carcello 2009; Morrell and Clark 2010;
O’Brien 2009); where auditing can be used to ascribe to
corporations responsibilities that extend beyond those
currently enshrined in law.
This binary is familiar in terms of the rivalry between
shareholder and stakeholder accounts of the firm. However,
to foreshadow our findings, detailed analysis of debate on
conflict minerals reveals a much more complex interplay
between these two dialectically opposed constructions of
corporate responsibility. In practice, either conception of
the corporations—as trader or as citizen—is being mobi-
lized by both groups with opposing goals. To analyse this,
we use a distinction made famous by the former Labour
M.P. Tony Benn, who talked about two kinds of politi-
cians—those with deep, ideological roots, and those who
shifted in the winds of public opinion. He memorably said
of Mrs Thatcher:
The idea of a spin doctor controlling [her] was
laughable. She was a signpost, not a weathervane,
although she was a signpost which pointed in the
wrong direction. Tony Benn
These constructions: the corporation as trader or as citizen
may seem like ideological signposts, but in highly complex
and contested contexts, these accounts of responsibility are
more like weathervanes that shift and can be shifted by
currents of rhetoric. This analysis has two principal impli-
cations. First, it shows that to understand corporate respon-
sibility, we not only need an account of the responsible
corporation, we also need empirical detail on how that
account itself is mobilized as a discursive resource. This
contributes to an ongoing debate in the Journal of Business
Ethics in relation to whether CSR is ‘‘empty rhetoric’’
(Driver 2006; Kallio 2007; Sethi 2014). Second, explaining
corporate responsibility in the context of conflict minerals is
a rich contribution to debate on how purportedly neutral
accounting practices (relating to corporate disclosure) are
heavily imbued with ethical reasoning.
We begin by introducing extant literature on discourses
of corporate social responsibility and accounting setting
and discuss how discursive representations of the corpo-
ration impact accounting standard setting. Next, we derive
opposing conceptions of the corporation as trader or as
citizen. Then after posing our research question, we explain
our methodology and report our empirical findings. We
conclude after discussing our findings. Our analysis shows
how understanding responsibility is not just simply about
models of the responsible corporation, but about how these
accounts are mobilized.
1 According to the 2007 survey of International Rescue Committee
(IRC), estimated number of deaths due to the conflict in DRC between
August 1998 and April 2007 is 5.4 million (International Rescue
Committee 2007).
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Discourses of Corporate Responsibility
and Accounting Standard Setting
There is now a well-established critical literature looking at
how corporations present themselves discursively vis-a`-vis
social justice and environmental issues. In one sense, cor-
porations resist attempts to construct themselves as any-
thing other than economic actors. In another sense, they
embrace more ethico-moral conceptions of the firm by
articulating increasingly elaborate and stylized discourses
around corporate social responsibility and sustainable
development, often to establish their brands. Milne et al.
(2006), for example, document how corporations embrace
sustainability through invoking the metaphor of ‘the jour-
ney’, which corporations claim to have embarked upon but
conveniently precludes the clear mapping of any destina-
tion that might induce significant reform in corporate
behaviour. Similarly, Spence (2007) shows how companies
blend economic and socio-environmental discourses in
order to advance a ‘win–win’ ideology where the two are
perceived as being mutually reinforcing. Essentially,
although signifiers such as ‘sustainable development’ and
‘corporate social responsibility’ imply an opening up of
accepted understandings of who the corporation is, corpo-
rate discourse is effectively employed in order to re-
establish corporate hegemony of the discursive terrain
(Tregidga et al. 2014). According to these views, corporate
adoption of the language of sustainability and responsi-
bility gives the impression of substantive changes to cor-
porate activities but really only elicits second-order
concessions (Levy et al. 2015; Spence 2009).
These studies usefully draw attention to the shifting and
pliable character of corporate discourse on responsibility.
In turn, this illustrates how CSR can become ‘‘empty
rhetoric’’ (Driver 2006; Kallio 2007; Sethi 2014), where
superficial changes merely serve to reproduce existing
inequalities and entrench power relations. However, it
should also be recognized that any such hegemony is
established on multiple levels. Often corporate discourse
on a specific issue, for instance: sustainability and conflict
minerals, is heavily shaped by previous battles fought via
industry bodies to shape legislative processes that furnish
rules and regulations about how corporations have to
account for their activities. The literature on accounting
standard setting shows that the parameters around corpo-
rate disclosures are often largely set at this deeper, insti-
tutional level (Bealing 1994; Bozanic et al. 2012; Young,
2014).
Even if often presented as a technical activity, standard
setting in accounting is not a value-neutral practice. Moral
and political considerations are omnipresent even when
looking at ostensibly technical domains such as stock
options (Young 2014). This is even more evident when
looking at corporate accountability in explicitly moral or
ethical domains such as CSR. For example, in analysing a
standard setting process in Spain which purported to
expand corporate accountability into non-financial areas
such as environmental impact and social responsibility,
Archel et al. (2011) show how a range of different interest
groups expressed multiple and conflicting viewpoints. Yet
institutional outcomes reflected the interests of dominant
groups such as corporations and right-wing think tanks.
Archel et al. (2011) conclude that consultation processes
and comment periods are subject to the mobilization of bias
(Bachrach and Baratz 1970). That heretical discourses are
aired, on the surface, is suggestive of dialogue and a search
for compromise solutions. However, heretical discourses
are inextricably caught up in a process of legitimisation:
they have little impact on the institutional outcomes, but
they confer legitimacy on the whole standard setting pro-
cess by giving credence to standard setter claims that they
have considered the viewpoints of all interested parties
(Archel et al. 2011).
The SEC, the US regulator of financial markets, reflects
such political activity in the construction of disclosure
standards. The SEC was set up via an act of Congress in
1933 following widespread concern over corporate
malfeasance and opacity in the wake of the Great Crash. Its
official remit was to ‘‘prevent the exploitation of the public
through misrepresentations by providing true information
to investors’’ (Bealing, 1994, p. 556). The stated mission of
the SEC today as the ‘‘Investor’s Advocate’’ has changed
little, as the following excerpt from its website confirms:
The mission of the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission is to protect investors, maintain fair,
orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital
formation (SEC 2014)
Yet, rather than a neutral standard setter, SEC regulation is in
many ways a reflection of the interests that shape it. Bealing
(1994) describes the close relationship that the SEC has with
Congress, on whom it depends for its funding. Bealing
(1994) argues the SEC is first and foremost concerned with
legitimating itself to Congress. This leads to largely
ceremonial exchanges between the two, since the SEC’s
ultimate objective is to sustain funding rather than deal with
any substantive regulatory concerns. Similarly, Bozanic
et al. (2012) draw attention to theways inwhich the targets of
SEC regulation (i.e. disclosing companies) can influence the
regulation that they are to be subjected to. SEC regulation
should not be viewed as a purely exogenous variable that
companies have to conform to, but as something to be
‘‘endogenized’’ and built, as much as possible, in the image
of the companies themselves.
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We contribute to these two strands of literature: dis-
cursive representations of the corporation and accounting
standard setting. We argue that the former often pays
insufficient attention to the ways in which corporate
accounts are effectively pre-empted by politically charged
legislative processes. It is perhaps no surprise that corpo-
rations represent themselves in the way that they do vis-a`-
vis sustainability, and CSR given the huge time and effort
that has gone into articulating a discursive position that is
bolstered by institutional bodies and legislative processes.
Extant research would suggest that counter-hegemonic
viewpoints are only likely to be accommodated superfi-
cially and in ways that support dominant interests (Archel
et al. 2011; Levy 2005; Milne et al. 2006; Spence 2007).
But studies looking at the political and partisan nature of
standard setting often downplay the discursive openings
that even neutered legislation can potentially offer. As
Levy (2005, p. 60) points out, the fact that corporations
adopted the rhetoric of sustainability and conceded to
reporting toxic releases enabled environmentalists to call
attention to discrepancies between PR and reality and exert
further pressure to reduce emissions.
Conceptions of the Corporation
Our review above indicates that previous work looking at
the regulation of capital market participants has shown how
the standard-setting process involves the mobilization of
sectional interests and a masquerade where such interests
are disguised as technical neutrality. The purpose of the
present study is not to determine the success or otherwise
of different strategies, but rather to understand how dif-
ferent actors incorporate different conceptions of the cor-
poration into their discursive strategies.
Economists, legal commentators and management
scholars have for a long-time debated competing notions of
the corporation: Is the corporation a nexus of contracts, or is
it a citizen? Below, we review these two prominent notions
of the corporation as trader, drawing on the nexus-of-con-
tracts theory of the corporation, and as citizen, drawing on
the corporate citizenship literature. These accounts shape
how the moral responsibilities, duties and obligations of a
corporation and its accountability are conceptualized.
Corporation as Trader
The economic, contractarian view of the firm, generally
attributed to Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) Theory of the
Firm, conceptualizes the firm as a nexus of contracts
between different parties—primarily shareholders, direc-
tors, employees, suppliers and customers. Essentially, the
firm is a ‘‘trader’’. Despite the constitutional, legal notion of
corporate personhood, this view, which has shaped corpo-
rate law, dominated legal scholarship and perceptions about
corporate responsibility, rejects that the corporation is an
entity with independent existence (Jensen and Meckling
1976). Instead, the corporation, a ‘‘legal fiction’’, is decon-
structed into a series of transactions, which presents just an
alternative form of contracting to markets (Coase 1937).
Consequently, the idea of a moral conscience does not
square well with the notion of a fictitious entity that is
nothing but an intersection of voluntary agreements.
Stressing the voluntary, market-oriented nature of con-
tracting, this conception dismisses the notion that the cor-
poration owes anything to the state or other stakeholders
outside its contracts. Accordingly, CSR, defined as ‘‘ac-
tions that appear to further some social good, beyond the
interests of the firms and that which is required by law’’
(McWilliams and Siegel 2001, p. 117), is thus seen outside
a firm’s purpose and obligation. As Margolis and Walsh
(2003) note, this view holds that firms already advance
social welfare in an economy, and do so best, by creating
economic wealth through maximizing firm value for
shareholders as residual claimants (Jensen 2002; Friedman
1970). In other words, maximizing long-term shareholder
value is the one objective that best advances social welfare.
This view leads to a very narrow conception of corporate
responsibilities, which, as Scherer and Palazzo (2011,
p. 904) note, is based on three premises. First, as outlined in
Friedman’s (1970) well-rehearsed criticism of corporate
social responsibility, the roles of the state and businesses
should remain clearly separated so that resources are opti-
mally allocated as different actors focus on what they do
best. Addressing social problems is thus the role of the state.
Second, the core responsibilities of the corporations are
fiduciary responsibilities to their shareholders. Third, pro-
moting social welfare beyond legal obligations is not a duty
but a voluntary activity that is justified only if it advances
long-term shareholder value (Jensen 2002). This view on
corporate responsibility is reflected in studies seeking to
prove the business case for CSR by demonstrating that
responsible behaviour is consistent with maximizing wealth
or even contributes to it (cf. Margolis and Walsh 2003).
Corporation as Citizen
An alternative conception of the corporation as ‘‘citizen’’
provides a different vantage point for viewing the com-
pany’s role in, or responsibilities towards society or the
public good (Carcello 2009; Morrell and Clark 2010;
O’Brien 2009). Under the notion of ‘‘corporate citizenship’’,
corporations have an ‘‘obligation to constituent groups in
society other than stockholders’’ (Jones 1980, p. 59). Matten
et al. (2003) argue that corporate citizenship is a descriptive
term that reflects corporations’ self-understanding and was
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popularized not only by academics but also by practitioners
themselves, who created a discourse around being a good
corporate citizen. The view stresses that the corporation is a
state-created entity with legal personhood. As a person, the
corporation assumes ‘‘its rightful place in society, next to
other ‘‘citizens’’, with whom the corporation forms a com-
munity. Citizenship then focuses on rights and responsibil-
ities of all members of the community, which are mutually
interlinked and dependent upon each other’’ (Waddell 2000;
cited in Matten et al. 2003, p. 111).
Corporate citizenship does not exclusively or even pri-
marily mean that corporations should receive rights and
duties analogous to a citizen. Instead, it means that the
corporation is a public and political actor, and one that in
turn plays a role in the protection and facilitation of indi-
viduals’ citizen’s rights (Matten and Crane 2005). This new
political role of the corporation is normatively reflected in
‘‘willingness and capacity of the corporation to participate
in the public process of exchanging arguments, its
engagement in solving broader societal challenges, and its
accountability and transparency’’ (Scherer and Palazzo
2007, p. 1109). As political actors, corporations can protect
or underpin the rights of individual stakeholders, particu-
larly in contexts where there is incomplete regulation
(Matten and Crane 2005). The redrawing of lines separat-
ing the state and the corporation can be understood in the
context of globalization. In the global economy, and where
supply chains span borders, the state has often failed to act
as the guarantor of social, civil and political citizenship
rights. In some cases, transnational corporations have
stepped into assume quasi-governmental governance duties
and address social ills amid regulatory voids (Scherer and
Palazzo 2011). Matten and Crane (2005) argue that the
outcome is a form of ‘‘civil regulation’’ where transnational
corporations co-create new global regimes of private gov-
ernance, such as multi-stakeholder forms of CSR alongside
civil society actors (Scherer and Palazzo 2007).
Research Question
In summary, the corporation as trader tends to be associ-
ated with a narrow view of corporate responsibilities while
the corporation as citizen is associated with an expanded
view of corporate responsibilities. Importantly, these are
ideal-type representations rather than empirical descrip-
tions of corporations. In this sense, they could be seen as
signposts. In practice though, where responsibility is
heavily contested and complex, they might be more fluid
and mobile, serving as powerful rhetorical tools to define
‘‘rightful’’ corporate responsibilities. From the perspective
of Laclau, the corporation constitutes a ‘‘floating signifier’’
(2005) the meaning of which is contested and at stake in
the specific institutional struggle over the accountability of
corporations vis-a`-vis conflict minerals. We thus ask: how
do stakeholders work with these rival conceptions of cor-
porate responsibility, in attempts to influence legislative
processes centered on responsibility and in settings that are
highly complex and contested?
Research Methods and Background to the Case
The regulation of conflict minerals reporting is an appro-
priate context in which to explore standard-setting dynamics
because there are such opposing viewpoints in relation to
their auditability—and consequently the construction of the
corporation. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act was adopted by the United States
in July 2010. Section 1502 of this act introduced a new
reporting requirement which effectively constructed cor-
porate responsibility for conflict minerals (Reinecke and
Ansari 2015): all publicly traded companies in the US must
disclose annually whether any minerals that are necessary to
the functionality or production of a product of the company,
originated in DRC or an adjoining country and, if so, to
provide a report describing the measures taken to exercise
due diligence on the source and chain of custody of those
minerals, which must include an independent private sector
audit of the report that is certified by the company submitting
the report. Section 1502 added Section 13(p) to the Secu-
rities Exchange Act of 1934, which required the SEC to
promulgate the related rules. The SEC Final Rule was
adopted on August 22, 2012. Before adopting this rule, the
SEC sought public comments and held a public
roundtable on October 18, 2011 at which invited partici-
pants, including investors, affected issuers, human rights
organizations, and other stakeholders such as auditors, dis-
cussed their views. In the consultation following the release
of the draft rules in December 2010, SEC received 431
unique individual comment letters (some letters duplicated
previous letters and were therefore omitted in the analysis).
Table 1 shows the distribution of the comment letters
coming from various stakeholders as well as conceptions
used in their comment letters. As each comment letter typ-
ically uses more than one conception, the number of con-
ceptions used are generally greater than the number of letters
provided by each stakeholder.2
2 Most letters used ‘‘trader’’ and/or ‘‘citizen’’ concepts. However,
there were a few letters not using any of these concepts, such as letters
laying out the audit types, details about mineral tracing studies,
European Commission’s report titled as ‘‘Tailoring trade and
investment policy for these countries most in need’’ which is not
directly related to the conflicts mineral regulation, etc. Such letters are
put in the ‘‘other’’ category.
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The ostensive importance of these comments letters was
acknowledged by the SEC:
We have reviewed and considered all of the com-
ments that we received relating to the rulemaking.
The final rule reflects changes from the proposed
rules made in response to many of these comments
(SEC 2012, p. 19)
Therefore, the legislation opened up a discursive space
which presented the possibility to advance a new, more
morally expansive conception of the corporation.
We examined all the letters, as well as the SEC’s final
rule (SEC 2012) which compares the final rules to the
proposed rules, and identified the issues that were dis-
cussed. We then uploaded each of the 431 unique letters
into NVivo software and coded them prior to a content
analysis. Two members of the research team elaborated the
coding schema in early 2014 while substantive coding of
the letters took place between June and August 2014.
Numerous meetings took place during this time between
the research team in order to review and revise the coding
schema. This involved several codes being renamed, sep-
arated out into numerous new codes or, at times, amalga-
mated under a more general coding signifier.
The initial codes generated were essentially topic based.
For example, there were codes related to ‘economic con-
sequences’ of the legislation or ‘what companies fell within
the legislation’s purview’. This first wave resulted in the
identification of 42 different issue ‘nodes’, with references
to the issue ranging from 1 at the bottom end through to
217 at the top end. See Table 2 for a sample list of the
codes.
A second wave of coding was undertaken in order to
ascertain political positions vis-a`-vis a certain topic. A key
concern here was to identify clear statements either for or
against a specific proposal. For example, on the topic of
‘keeping business records’, 23 comments were identified.
Statements in this code expressed a clear opinion either in
favour (19) or against (4) issuers being forced to keep
business records. As with previous research that shows the
often bifurcated nature of specific-issue deliberations
(Archel et al. 2011), it was generally quite straightforward
to infer a clear opinion either for or against a specific
proposal. Where there was ambiguity or opacity on an
issue, this was classified in a third category, ‘neither clearly
for nor clearly against’.
In addition to coding by theme and coding by political
position vis-a`-vis the theme, a third and final wave of data
analysis was undertaken to understand the kinds of argu-
ments deployed by stakeholders. At this point, particular
attention was paid to the diversity of different arguments
advanced and the identity of the interlocutors. The more
common themes articulated were identified and patterns by
organization type established. Represented in the results
section below are quotes that more accurately reflect the
different views articulated around specific issues. The
issues below were often the most frequently discussed in
the comments letters. For example, the issue node giving
the greatest coverage was the ‘humanitarian concern’ node,
which was broached by 217 different contributors. How-
ever, these were often straightforward statements express-
ing general sympathy with the goal of resolving armed
conflict in the region, serving as a prelude into more sub-
stantive issue consideration. As such, this issue node was
not subject to significant additional analysis. More inter-
esting for the purposes of analysis are those issue nodes
that we perceive as reflecting the most important changes
from the SEC’s initial proposal or those that produced the
greatest polarity or interest. It is on these issue nodes that
the article focuses on primarily.
These various waves of data analysis led to the identi-
fication of two broadly grouped discursive coalitions that
each coalesced around different conceptions of the corpo-
ration. In one camp, ‘the corporation as trader’ comprised
many corporations, industry associations and other repre-
sentatives such as lawyers or think-tanks and politicians
who were principally from the Republican Party. The
majority of their arguments was for narrowing down the
liabilities of companies and centred around the economic,
reputational, or legal costs and operational difficulties of
implementing the conflict minerals legislation into their
nexus of contracts. While publicly most industry actors felt
compelled to positively acknowledge the humanitarian
Table 1 Stakeholder distribution of comment letters and conceptions
used
Stakeholder type Conceptions used in the letters
Citizen Trader Other
Politician
27 19 19 0
Individual investors and consumers
135 125 25 0
Industry
157 84 125 10
Institutional investors
10 5 0 9
NGOs
67 59 22 5
Governments
10 6 2 2
Advisors
25 4 17 6
Total
431 302 210 32
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Table 2 Sample codes
Code Definition Sample quotes Number
of letters
File versus
furnish
Whether Conflict Mineral Report
(CMR) would require to be
furnished or filed to the SEC
Given the materiality of the data in evaluating a company’s risk, we urge the
Commission to require all information outlined in the proposed rule to be
filed in the body of the annual report rather than furnished as an exhibit’’
(Boston Common Asset Management
We strongly agree that CMRs should be treated as ‘‘furnished’’, not filed, for
Exchange Act purposes. Since the purpose of CMRs (like the other
Section 13(p) disclosures) is not to convey information material to
investors, as such, issuers should not be responsible to investors under
Exchange Act liability provisions for them (New York Bar Association
Securities Regulation Committee)
36
Keeping
business
records
Whether companies should be
required to keep reviewable
business records about their
supply chain to be later audited
about the compliance to the
regulation
Companies should be required to maintain business records involving DRC
minerals for at least 7 years. The records must be viewable and be made
available when a dispute of country of origin arises (Extractive Industries
Working Group)
No requirement for reviewable business records—similarly, Section 1502
does not require the Commission to include in the new rules any
requirement for an issuer to maintain reviewable business records to
support its determination of the source of its conflict minerals (Cleary
Gottlieb Steen Hamilton LLP)
23
Auditor
independence
Whether independence of auditor
of Conflict Mineral Reports
would be impaired if it were also
auditing the financial reports of
the company
Accounting firms other than the financial auditor (or any of numerous other
qualified resources) may perform the audit that supports registrants’
disclosures (CPEA Consulting)
Also if the company were required to, or chose to, make an assertion that
their due diligence process as described in their Conflict Minerals Report
was in conformity with the OECD Guidance, the auditor might also be
subject to the independence principle described on page 31 of the OECD
Guidance. That independence principle’s prohibition on the auditor having
provided any other service for the auditee company within a 24-month
period could significantly limit the pool of auditors. (Ernst and Young)
10
Gold Whether or not should gold be
treated differently because of its
unique qualities
To provide special conditions or exemptions for gold or any other mineral
weakens the intent of the disclosure rules. (Calvert Asset Management)
We do not believe that the Commission’s reporting standards should apply
equally to all so-called conflict minerals. Gold is unique among the so-
called conflict minerals (columbite-tantalite (coltan), cassiterite, and
wolframite) due to the role it plays in the global financial economy and
because of its chemical properties (World Gold Council)
42
Embargo Whether or not Conflict Minerals
regulation would create a defacto
embargo for DRC
Dodd Frank 1502 does not place a de facto embargo on minerals from the
DRC. Dodd Frank 1502 is a disclosure requirement only and places no ban
or penalty on the use of conflict minerals (ICAR)
This has given rise to a significant disincentive scenario to multinational and
US consumers which has resulted in them avoiding purchase of metal
products that contained DRC tin even if the metal producer has complied
with due diligence guidelines aimed at achieving ‘DRC conflict free’
material as required by Dodd Frank (Malaysia Smelting Corporation)
62
Fighting
humanitarian
conflict
Acknowledging that the regulation
is a necessary step in fighting the
humanitarian conflict in DRC
I am pleased to hear that you have taken the step towards creating a safer
world, especially a safer DRC. It is good to know that you have set the
expectation that companies will either use conflict free minerals or take
responsibility for not using them. Thank you for choosing to represent
morality in the world (Adam Marx).
We support the underlying goal of Sec. 1502 to address the atrocities
occurring in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and adjoining
countries,…we believe the proposed rule is overly burdensome and could
be modified to achieve the stated goal of the Dodd-Frank Act with less
burdensome measures. We believe the SEC should be mindful of President
Obama’s Executive Order (Executive Order 13563) ‘‘Improving
Regulation and Regulatory Review,’’ as well as the SEC’s own statutory
mandate to consider the effect of any new rule on ‘‘efficiency, competition,
and capital formation (Advanced Medical Technology Association)
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purpose of the legislation, they focused on the contractual
challenges. A spokesperson for General Electrics stated at
the SEC Roundtable (SEC 2011, p. 12):
a company like General Electric has many, many
thousands of suppliers that provide items containing
conflict minerals. And many of these suppliers are
suppliers of complex equipment themselves, who
have, again, thousands of suppliers in their supply
chains.
The question was thus treated as one of how conflict-free
mineral sourcing could be contractually passed down on
suppliers. Here, General Electric thus continued to argue
that such contractual agreements would be impossible to
implement:
when we issue a contract, the contract can’t say that
everything in a complicated piece of equipment has
to be from a verified smelter, because there’s no way
for a supplier to comply with that. (ibid., p. 29)
Even if companies that were in principle willing to make
due diligence efforts argued for the necessity of a generous
phase-in period to impose new contract terms and flow
down requirements because ‘‘it takes time, even to be able
to contractually obligate our direct suppliers’’ (ibid.) to
trace minerals.
The other camp, ‘the corporation as citizen’, comprised
a more heterogeneous group including NGOs, investors,
individuals and politicians in favour of stricter regulation.
Seeking to advance a strict interpretation of the legislation,
these stakeholders claimed that corporations had a
responsibility to stop or at least not to be involved in a
humanitarian conflict. In his opening statement at the SEC
Roundtable (SEC 2011, p. 38), Senator Durbin, a sponsor
of the legislation, summarized the main argument of the
‘‘citizen’’ coalition,
This is a question of corporate responsibility. I won’t
delve into this whole debate about whether a corpo-
ration is a person, a citizen, a voter or anything like
that, but I do believe having spoken to the leaders of
some of the most outstanding corporations in our
country that they want to do the right thing. I think
you can show them that path, a reasonable path that
will not only give them a clear conscience in the way
they conduct business, but have a measurable, posi-
tive impact on this part of the world.
Some groups were difficult to position as they floated
around either side of the antagonistic frontier. Beyond this,
it became apparent that groups belonging to one of the two
broad discursive coalitions also might advance a concep-
tion of the corporation that was more consistent with the
discursive strategies of the opposing discursive coalition. It
is these ‘counter-intuitive’ articulations that are revelatory
of actors’ different discursive strategies and we pay
specific attention to them below along with depicting
actor’s more orthodox discursive responses to specific
issues pertaining to the legislation.
Table 2 continued
Code Definition Sample quotes Number
of letters
Phase-in period Whether companies could be
granted a period before the
regulation became fully effective
to get prepared for it
Global Witness is calling for the SEC to publish strong rules that do not
contain a delay or phase-in period and that incorporate internationally
agreed due diligence standards as published in 2010 by the Organisation
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Publication of the
rules to accompany Section 1502 has been delayed since last April. This
long wait has caused uncertainty within industry. Although some
companies have begun taking steps ahead of the rules’ publication, others
have stated that without final rules, they are unsure of the law’s
requirements. Further delays risk undermining progress on industrywide
supply chain due diligence initiatives (Global Witness)
As discussed in our March 2, 2011 comments, IPC strongly supports a
phased implementation of the conflict minerals regulation to better align
regulatory requirements with developing traceability and transparency
systems (IPC-Association Connecting Electronics Industries
132
First
amendment
Whether requiring companies to
disclose that they are not DRC
Conflict free is against the First
Amendment Right
Constitutional lawyers may point out that the Proposed Rules could have
First Amendment issues in that they force companies to make public
statements as to whether their products are or are not from the DRC region.
Such statements are inherently political because they convey certain
judgments against sovereign governments in the DRC region. These
statements are meant to carry certain negative connotations against
specific sovereign nation states. Such a requirement is unprecedented
(Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, Ltd.)
3
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Of the 431 unique letters we analysed, 157 mainly belon-
ged to the ‘‘corporations as traders’’ camp, consisting of cor-
porations and their representatives, 212 mainly belonged to
the ‘‘corporations as citizens’’ camp, consisting of NGOs,
individual investors and consumers, and institutional inves-
tors. 62 of those letters belonged to the third category who
could be in either camp depending on their political back-
ground, the country they were representing, or the subject
matter being discussed; advisors, politicians and government
representatives belonged to this group. See Table 1 above for
the numerical distribution of commentators. In the following
section,we illustrate the discursive strategies of eachopposing
camp, showing how they each advance different conceptions
of the corporation, in often contradictory and counter-intuitive
ways, in an attempt to influence the legislative process.
Findings
Citizens Talking Like Traders
The debate about the legal status of disclosure require-
ments revealed how a coalition of NGOs and ethical
investors—who would be associated with a ‘corporation as
citizen’ construction of responsibility—also mobilized the
‘corporation as trader’ construction when convenient to
justify expanded responsibilities. The SEC’s proposal sta-
ted that conflict minerals reports would have to be fur-
nished, rather than filed. The distinction is important
because if a disclosure is filed rather than furnished, the
corporation who made that disclosure is liable for any
misleading statements. Misleading statements in disclosure
always bring some legal sanction, but the Securities and
Exchange Act involves additional liabilities to investors
who traded depending on the misleading statement filed
with the SEC. Several commentators argued that conflict
minerals posed reputation and supply chain risk, and
therefore disclosures about conflict minerals were no dif-
ferent than other financial disclosures that were being filed.
For example, in its letter February 1 2012, Boston Common
Asset Management, an institutional investor, says
Given the materiality of the data in evaluating a com-
pany’s risk, we urge the Commission to require all
information outlined in the proposed rule to be filed in
the body of the annual report rather than furnished as an
exhibit. This will allow investors greater assurance that
conflict minerals disclosure is as comprehensive,
transparent and accurate as possible.
Similarly, Enough, an NGO writes on March 2 2011:
Enough recommends, however, that the Commission
require issuers to file their Conflict Minerals Report,
including the audit report, with the Commission,
rather than simply furnish a copy. This distinction
between ‘‘filing’’ the report, and simply furnishing
such a report, is significant because it promotes
greater transparency, makes Section 15023 more
effective, and is consistent with the statute’s intent
and legislative history.
Beyond the file versus furnish debate, the proposal required
issuers to maintain reviewable business records supporting
its conclusion that its conflict minerals did not originate in
the covered countries based on its reasonable country of
origin. Several ‘‘citizens’’ agreed with the proposal and
gave examples of business record maintenance require-
ments of traders such as brokers and dealers, suggesting
that records about conflict minerals were not different than
other records of traders. In its comment letter dated
February 28, 2011, Global Witness, an NGO, says:
If companies are going to be held accountable for
their conflict minerals disclosures, they should be
required to retain these records for a sufficient period
of time to allow for review by the Commission or
other regulatory authorities. For example, the Com-
mission generally requires registered broker-dealers
and investment advisers to retain most business
related records for a period of three to 6 years…. The
general five-year statute of limitations applicable to
material misstatements also provides a useful
benchmark
Interestingly, Global Witness here uses a more traderesque
argument of ‘‘supply chain complexity’’, arguing that
maintaining business records for at least 5 years is
necessary:
Discovery of conflict mineral abuses, just like the
discovery of information suggesting false or mis-
leading statements by issuers, often occurs more than
one year after the conduct takes place or the state-
ment is made. Indeed, some industry sources have
informed us that it can take many months for a batch
of minerals to make their way through the whole
supply chain.
Similarly, CPEA Consulting, an advisory firm, says on its
letter dated October 31 2011:
It is standard practice for there to be a requirement for
documents and records that form the basis for com-
pliance with other regulations to be maintained and
available for a prescribed period of time.
3 Section 1502 refers to the section of The Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act which mandates the conflicts
minerals regulation.
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The SEC changed the proposal and did not put the
requirement of maintaining business records in its final
rule, in spite of recognizing that most commentators
thought otherwise (SEC 2012 p.160).
Some traders expressed concern that the legislation
would lead to a de facto economic embargo on all minerals
mined in the DRC (see below). Only a few NGOs
acknowledged the embargo as a potential problem (e.g.
Global Engagement Pact and Southern African Resource
Watch). Other NGOs, such as Enough (March 2 2011),
argued against the likelihood of such an embargo in a way
that reified existing corporate priorities:
On the contrary, Congo’s mineral reserves are too
great for world markets to ignore. For example,
Congo’s supply of tantalum accounts for at least
25 % of the world’s global supply.
This evocation of global financial interests via the construct
of ‘world markets’, something that Enough elsewhere in its
discourse appeared to be fundamentally critical of, illus-
trates how NGOs evoked ‘corporation as trader’ rhetoric, in
an attempt to debunk what they saw as scaremongering on
the embargo issue.
Traders Talking Like Traders
The OECD guidelines (OECD 2013)4 are the only
nationally or internationally recognized due diligence
standards on the conflict minerals issue. These guidelines
prohibit a Conflict Minerals Report auditor from having
provided any other service for the company within a
24-month period. In response to this, audit firms and
companies argued that such a prohibition would dramati-
cally decrease the pool of auditors. Audit firms also
claimed that they did not see any reason that auditing a
company’s financial statements would jeopardize auditor
independence when it comes to auditing the conflict min-
erals report but did not give any reason to back up such
claims. For example Deloitte (March 2 2011) wrote:
we do not believe that an external financial statement
auditor’s independence will be impaired if the auditor
were also to perform the IPSA (Independent Private
Sector Audit) of the issuer’s Conflict Minerals
Report.
In its final ruling, the SEC clarified the independence
standards and allowed a company’s auditor of the financial
reports to also audit the conflict minerals, in contrast to the
OECD guidelines (OECD 2013) and justified this with the
following remarks:
Conflict Minerals Statutory Provision only requires
an audit and no other functions that may imperil
independence, such as ‘‘management functions’’
described in Rule 2- 01(c)(4)(vi) of Regulation S-X.
Therefore, we do not believe that it would be
inconsistent with the independence requirements in
Rule 2-01 of Regulation S-X if the independent
public accountant also performs the independent
private sector audit of the Conflict Minerals Report.
(SEC 2012, p. 216)
It is very curious that Regulation S-X (United States Code
2012), legislation that came into force following perceived
excess in the provision of non-audit services, is invoked
here in order to justify the provision of non-audit services.
Both Regulation S-X and the OECD guidelines (OECD
2013) are clear about the potential compromise of
independence that the provision of such services can bring
about.
Advocating a narrow conception of responsibility, some
industry participants asserted that gold should be treated
differently than the other three conflict minerals because of
its unique qualities, bringing in cost considerations. For
example, Tiffany&Co (February 22, 2011) said:
Including gold in the definition of ‘‘conflicts materi-
als’’ is impractical and could lead to unintended bur-
dens because (a) the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (the ‘‘DRC’’) accounts for only a miniscule
amount of the global gold supply (0.3 % of the newly-
mined gold on the market in 2009) and (b) refined gold
bullion generally consists of gold from multiple sour-
ces that is smelted together, making it impossible to
trace such gold back to any particular source unless the
smelter employs single source batch input.
Similarly, Barrick Gold Corporation (February 28, 2011)
said:
With respect to the content of the audit report, we are
concerned that it has the potential to expose sensitive
information about, among other things, transportation
routes and storage facilities, which raises serious
security concerns and could put staff of the mining
company, smelters and refineries and others at risk.
The risk is particularly acute in the case of gold,
given the high value of this commodity.
The SEC kept it proposal as is and did not offer an
exception to gold in the final rule.
Traders, at least on the surface, applauded the efforts to
cease the humanitarian conflict in the DRC, but then very
quickly veered onto the costs of ceasing such conflict. For
example, in its letter dated March 2 2011, American
Apparel and Footwear Association wrote
4 The guidelines were published originally in 2011 and were updated
in 2013 to include the gold supplement, which was published in 2012.
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While we support efforts to prevent Conflict Minerals
to enter into global supply chains, including the
supply chains of our member companies, we are
concerned that application of this regulation may
have unintended adverse consequences for apparel
and footwear companies.
In a few cases, traders did not even acknowledge the
regulation’s benefits for reducing the humanitarian conflict
and focused purely on the adverse economic consequences
of the regulation (see letters of Washington Legal Foun-
dation, an establishment which describes itself as a non-
profit organization promoting limited government, March
30 2011, Taiwan Semi-Conductor Company Limited,
January 27 2011, and Tiffany&Co, February 22 2011).
Traders Talking Like Citizens
Interestingly, in addition to using ‘‘trader’’ argument in an
attempt to have gold exempted, traders also used a ‘‘citi-
zen’’ argument for the same purpose. World Gold Council
(the trade association for the gold industry), in its letter
dated February 28, 2011, highlighted the humanitarian uses
of gold:
We are concerned, however, that certain aspects of the
Proposed Rules will actually work to the detriment of
the statute’s humanitarian goals. For example, gold is
crucially important to certain pharmaceuticals and life-
saving medical treatments. Any regulation that
increases the costs of these pharmaceuticals or treat-
ments or that discourages companies from conducting
medical research involving the use of gold should be
avoided.
In launching a challenge to the moral legitimacy of the
legislation itself, many opponents mobilized a discourse
around corporations as concerned ‘‘citizens’’, stating that
they worried about the unintended consequences of the
legislation for artisanal miners. In that view, the legislation
would lead to a de facto embargo being implemented in the
DRC to the harm of poor communities. For example,
Viasystems Group, Inc. (August 9, 2012) argued that the
conflict minerals rule
may result in a de facto embargo on minerals mined
in the Congo, leaving many legitimate miners without
means to provide for their families.
Chuck Blakeman, an entrepreneur trading in Congolese
minerals, blamed NGOs for the de facto embargo and
copied a portion of his correspondence with Enough, an
NGO which had been very active in campaigning on
conflict minerals, to his letter the SEC.
You [Enough] and your organization continue to
deny the fact that there is a de facto embargo, but we
cannot find a buyer…of artisanal coltan…Only a few
of the lowest of the low [buyers] are hanging out in
Goma [Congolese mining town] buying coltan at as
little as 30 % of what it sold for before you told
everyone Congolese minerals were evil.
The embargo argument was mostly used for a phase-in
period, which was essentially a delay for the full enactment
of the regulation. For example, Chuck Blakeman, once
again argued (November 18, 2011):
Time is of the essence. Starvation does not wait for
the slow machinations of bureaucracy. Please act
quickly to provide a grace period.
Traders also asserted that the proposed legislation would
violate the First Amendment: the citizen’s right to free
speech. The main grounds for this were that the rules would
compel speech that is not of a commercial nature and
would require some issuers, such as those unable to
determine the status of their conflict minerals, to provide
false, stigmatizing information (SEC 2012). For example,
Tiffany&Co (February 22 2011) said:
Perhaps the most fundamental concern is that the
proposed regulations would compel speech in a
manner that violates the First Amendment. Specifi-
cally, the proposed regulations would require com-
panies which use gold and certain other minerals to
state publicly that their products support human rights
violations, even when there is no reason to believe
that is true.
On April 14 2014, The United States Court of Appeals
decided in National Association of Manufacturers et al. vs.
SEC that requiring companies to declare whether their
products are ‘‘DRC conflict free’’, unconstitutionally
compelled commercial speech, thus violating the First
Amendment. The Court ruled:
At all events, it is far from clear that the description at
issue—whether a product is ‘‘conflict free’’—is fac-
tual and non-ideological. Products and minerals do
not fight conflicts. The label ‘‘conflict free’’ is a
metaphor that conveys moral responsibility for the
Congo war. It requires an issuer to tell consumers that
its products are ethically tainted, even if they only
indirectly finance armed groups. An issuer, including
an issuer who condemns the atrocities of the Congo
war in the strongest terms, may disagree with that
assessment of its moral responsibility. And it may
convey that ‘‘message’’ through ‘‘silence.’’
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This ruling supports the interests of the ‘corporation as
trader’ coalition, but it is predicated on an anthropomor-
phization of the corporation. Moreover, the corporation is
afforded rights we understand in terms of personhood. Both
of these are logically closer to the ‘corporation as citizen’
construction of CSR.
On April 29 2014, SEC commented on the effect of the
court ruling, pointing out that most aspects of the conflict
minerals rule were not affected by First Amendment
objections. Thus, companies were expected to file any
reports required under Rule 13p-1 on or before the due date
of May 2014. However,
No company is required to describe its products as
‘‘DRC conflict free,’’ having ‘‘not been found to be
‘DRC conflict free,’’’ or ‘‘DRC conflict undeter-
minable.’’ If a company voluntarily elects to describe
any of its products as ‘‘DRC conflict free’’ in its
Conflict Minerals Report, it would be permitted to do
so provided it had obtained an independent private
sector audit (IPSA) as required by the rule.’’
On the other hand on April 28 2014 two SEC commis-
sioners, Daniel M. Gallagher and Michael S. Piwowar
individually published a ‘‘Joint Statement on the Conflict
Minerals Decision’’:
We believe that the entirety of the rule should be
stayed, and no further regulatory obligations should
be imposed, pending the outcome of this litiga-
tion…A full stay is essential because the district court
could (and, in our view, should) determine that the
entire rule is invalid.
This suggested that there was a split within the SEC on the
matter. The Court did not determine the entire rule to be
invalid, and companies submitted their first Conflict Miner-
als Report to the SEC as planned. At the time of writing,
aspects of the legislation were still being contested.
Citizens Talking Like Citizens
Seeking to advance a strict interpretation of the legislation,
several stakeholders claimed that corporations had a
responsibility to stop or at least not to be involved in a
humanitarian conflict. As the faith group A Thousand Sis-
ter’s Outcry for Congo (December 15 2010) argued:
‘‘major U.S. industries simply cannot be allowed to con-
tinue profiting from the blood and suffering of the Con-
golese people’’. Similarly, senior school students from
Idaho wrote (May 31 2012):
We are writing to you because legislation has been
passed, Section 1502 in the Dodd-Frank Act, that
would make it much more difficult for these rebel
groups to make money by selling conflict minerals.
Without these profits rebel groups will have a much
harder time continuing their violent activities. How-
ever, we are frustrated that these rules are being held
up and watered down in the Security and Exchange
Commission. Some people are even calling for the
Section 1502 to be repealed because it causes extra
expense to American companies. The electronics
companies in question are some of the most prof-
itable and innovative in our nation. We are confident
that they can afford to support human rights and
figure out how to make this process work, even in the
very complex situation presented in the DRC.
Citizenship responsibilities obliged companies to take
actions to resolve this conflict even if such a responsibility
‘‘may be lost in pursuit of profit’’ (Presbyterian Church,
February 15 2012). Advocating stakeholders included
individuals who were concerned about the conflict,
investors, NGOs, politicians, as well as companies who
had already taken steps to make their supply chains more
responsible. For instance, under the fitting header of the
‘‘Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition’’ (EICC), a
group of electronics companies supported the development
a conflict-free smelter programme in response to civil
society pressures.
Many citizens argued against a gold exemption as gold
was one of the primary drivers of the conflict in DRC. For
example, an investor group wrote (February 1 2012):
Reporting standards should be consistent with the
statutory language of Section 1502 and should
therefore apply disclosure rules equally to all stipu-
lated conflict minerals—namely tin, tantalum, tung-
sten and gold. For example, gold has been a key
contributor to conflict financing in the DRC.
Most NGOs also argued against a phase-in period. For
example, International Corporate Accountability
Roundtable (ICAR), a coalition of human rights
groups including Amnesty International, EarthRights Inter-
national, Global Witness, Human Rights First, and Human
Rights Watch. ICAR, along with their partner Enough, said
the following in its letter dated August 24 2011:
The sad reality is that the majority of businesses will
not live up to their responsibilities until legally
compelled to do so. A delay in the implementation of
the law means further scope for armed groups in
Congo that kill and rape to finance themselves via the
minerals trade.
The final rule modified the proposal and provided a
transition period for all companies for 2 years and for
smaller companies for 4 years.
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Discussion
The differing viewpoints identified from the comments let-
ters can be viewed as struggles over a different conception of
what, or perhaps who, the corporation is. On one side of the
antagonistic frontier is a coalition of mining companies,
manufacturing organizations and professional service firms
who are predictably either against the legislation per se, or in
favour of a very light-touch interpretation of it. This group
coalesce around a ‘corporation as trader’ construction of
CSR. This denotes a very narrow economic interpretation as
even investor-centric concerns relating to risk management
are often excluded. Indeed, there is a fundamental contra-
diction here in that the nexus of contracts view generally
posits shareholder primacy, but the evidence presented
locates investors on the opposing side of the antagonistic
frontier from corporations. Ethico-moral concerns are not
written out of this coalition. Indeed, the notion that compa-
nies do not have responsibilities for armed conflict in the
Congo—which is broadly what underpins the discourse of
this coalition—is itself an ethico-moral stance.
On the other side of the antagonistic frontier is a
coalition of investors, NGOs, interested individuals and
various politicians and civil servants who were broadly in
favour of the legislation per se and often keen to advance a
wider and farther reaching interpretation of it. We refer to
this group here as coalescing around a ‘corporation as
citizen’ construction of CSR. Implicit within this concep-
tion is both a far-reaching understanding of economic
consequences (encompassing risk management concerns of
investors); and of ethico-moral considerations—in that it
sees the resolution of conflict in the DRC as something
corporations are in some way responsible for.
Often those on the ‘corporation as citizen’ side of the
frontier would evoke ‘corporation as trader’ arguments to
appeal to the sensibilities of legislators. Equally, those on
the ‘corporation as trader’ side of the frontier would evoke
humanitarian concerns or ‘corporation as citizen’ argu-
ments in order to argue against the proposed legislation.
Understanding CSR in this setting is therefore not a simple
case of different signposts pointing either to ‘corporation as
citizen’ or ‘corporation as trader’. Rather, both conceptions
are articulated and advanced by each coalition. The
meaning of the corporation itself is brought into question
by the legislation, but different groups seeking to advance a
particular vision of who the corporation is, will mobilize
the vision of their opponents in order to win specific bat-
tles. Rather than signposts or clear ideological coordi-
nates—these constructions shift and take on new senses
depending on whichever argument seems to advance a
cause best.
To highlight this more specifically, a complex, seem-
ingly counter-intuitive discourse emerges from each
coalition. As seen in Fig. 1, expanded conceptions of the
corporation are advanced by those who seek to ultimately
circumscribe corporate accountability, whereas conversely,
circumscribed conceptions of the corporation are advanced
by those who seek to ultimately expand corporate
accountability.
Future research might usefully explore the relative
success of mobilizing counter-intuitive discourses, or of
adopting the language of one’s opponents. The present
study has been less concerned with the efficacy of different
strategies than with understanding the conceptual compo-
sition of different discursive strategies. With the passage of
time, it will be easier to determine the efficacy or otherwise
Fig. 1 Conceptions of the
corporation as discursive
strategy
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of the legislation and thereby placed these different
strategies in context. Such analyses would also be well
placed to draw inferences regarding the way in which
power differentials affect legislative and institutional out-
comes, something that the present study was equally not
designed to ascertain.
Conclusion
Many of our twenty first century corporations are tied to
contexts such as the DRC, just as the predecessor of the
modern corporation, the East India Company, which
Robins (2002) dubs the first transnational corporation:
…the underlying thirst for bullion in the East forced a
powerful linkage with the growing slave economies
of the Atlantic. A terrible triangle was formed with
African slaves being purchased in part with Indian
cotton goods, then being sold in the Americas for
new-mined gold and silver, which in turn found its
way via London to India where it procured more
textiles. And as tea succeeded Indian textiles as its
most profitable product, so the Company sought ways
to equally dominate the trade with China (Robins
2002, pp. 80–81).
Looking back through the centuries at the East India
Company, we realize their practices trading in Gold,
Textiles, Tea and Slaves were abhorrent. There is no
contemporary analogue for this gruesome supply chain.
Yet, notwithstanding more complex manufacturing pro-
cesses and global supply and consumption chains, corpo-
rations and their regulators are helping to perpetuate
modern slavery and human exploitation (Crane 2013). Is it
more plausible for the corporation to cast itself as a nexus
of contracts, passive in the face of a Gordian knot of
transactions? Or is it inevitably, and unwillingly perhaps, a
citizen on the world stage that acknowledges its connect-
edness within global production networks? Rather than
more narrow contract responsibility the latter calls for full
responsibility for the human rights impacts that are linked
to operations upstreaming the value chain (Schrempf-
Stirling et al. 2012; Reinecke and Ansari 2015). Here we
join a conversation in the Journal of Business Ethics on the
responsibilities of the corporate citizen in developing
contexts (Agbiboa 2012; Janssen et al. 2013; Rotter et al.
2013), CSR ‘‘rhetoric’’ (Driver 2006; Kallio 2007; Sethi
2014) and public good (Carcello 2009; Morrell and Clark
2010; O’Brien 2009). Our specific contribution to this
debate is to highlight the wavering nature of rhetoric on
both sides of the divide. Corporations and their adversaries
each employ ‘citizen’ and ‘trader’ arguments. However,
analysis reveals that the politico-ideological coordinates
underlying this rhetoric are readily identifiable. CSR
discourse, even when appearing to change direction
depending on prevailing institutional winds, can be reve-
latory of more fixed material interests. It is the responsi-
bility of researchers to penetrate discursive fac¸ades and
expose the political programmes that underpin CSR
rhetoric.
While the context of conflict minerals throws up
important questions for understanding corporate responsi-
bility, it also prompts questions for us as consumers. If the
phone in our pocket relies on components sourced in war-
torn DRC, then to what extent are we (ethically) respon-
sible? The globalized nature of supply chains, manufac-
turing industries and the consumer goods industry seem to
confront consumers with an impossibly high, Kantian
standard for responsibility. On the one hand, schemes have
emerged that enable consumers to source tea, flowers or
fruit responsibly. For instance, by earmarking products as
‘‘fair’’, Fair Trade helps ethical consumers (understood
broadly) offset problems in how, global capitalism dis-
tances them from producers (Morrell and Jayawardhena
2010; Reinecke 2010). On the other hand, this means that
an ethical consumer relies on third-party arbiters of fair-
ness: the Fairtrade standard setter or the SEC. This requires
a shared and generalizable view of corporate responsibil-
ity—of what it is fair for firms to do.
But the SEC is less like an independent arbiter than it is a
flawed and partial clearing house for complexity and rhetor-
ical clutter: a space where dust is thrown up by both sides of
the rival corporation-as-trader and corporation-as-citizen
camps. Our analysis shows how neither of these camps sticks
to a principled view, in the sense that each will wear the
other’s clothing if it is the more effective way to press their
cause. As a discipline perhaps we too are failing because in
providing rival accounts of CSR, rather than ideologically
fixed signposts that might anchor debate, we have furnished
both with constructions that are weathervanes. The implica-
tion of this goes broader than questioning whether CSR is
rhetoric, instead we need to accept the role CSR plays as
rhetoric, in shaping how responsibility itself is constructed.
Finally, a note of caution on the prominent role that the
‘conflict minerals’ problem has played in shaping public
and political discourse. The Dodd Frank Act has, among
other things, drawn attention to the situation in the DRC.
However, there is a danger if conventional wisdom comes
to attribute the DRC’s problems primarily to local mis-
management of resources leading to a ‘resource curse’.
Longue dure´e histories of the DRC tend to view conflict
minerals as a more recent manifestation of how ‘‘the wealth
of the country has leaked away abroad’’ (Trapido 2015).
According to Trapido (2015), conflict minerals are a cor-
relate to the dual curses of capital flight and being stuck in
a primitive phase of capital accumulation—money made in
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the DRC tends to end up in tax havens off-shore instead of
being reinvested in infrastructure and development. The
militarized scramble for resources exploded after the
overthrow of Mobutu in the 1990s (Trapido 2015), but the
often violent integration of DRC’s minerals into interna-
tional capital circuits started with the colonial exploitation
of the country. Therefore, as important as it is to analyse
discursive shenanigans surrounding the ‘conflict minerals’
problem, placing conflict minerals at the root of the conflict
should be recognized as a causal construction that aims at
‘taming’ the wicked problem (Reinecke and Ansari 2015),
but it is only the tip of the iceberg as far as the DRC’s
governance problems are concerned.
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